First Question. Whether there is in generable and corruptible things any positive substantial entity really distinct from the form

Scotus, Sent. 2 d.12 q.1
Richard of St. Victor Quodlibet 4 q.5 a.1

1. As to the twelfth distinction the question is first raised whether there is in generable and corruptible things any positive substantial entity really distinct from the form

2. That there is not: Metaphysics 7 text 8, matter is not a what nor a what-sort-of and so on with the other categories; therefore it is nothing. You will say it is being in potency. But to the contrary: matter is not in potency, for matter does not come from matter; nor is matter form, nor is it the composite; therefore, by elimination, it is nothing.

3. Again Physics 5 text 8: What is changed exists, what is generated does not exist. Hereby Aristotle means to distinguish between the subject of generation and that of other changes. So in the same way he removes from the subject of generation that which is matter, just as he attributes what is matter to the subject of change; but what changes is being in potency in the sense of potency in Physics 3 text 6; therefore being in potency is taken away from matter, and so, by elimination, matter is a pure nothing.

4. Again if matter were a per se being it would, according to the Philosopher, be per se knowable; but matter is not knowable save by analogy with form, Physics 1 text 69

5. Again if matter were a per se being it would be an act, and then the composite would not be per se one.

6. To the contrary is Aristotle Physics 2 text 28, that matter is what, present in a thing, a thing is made of. From the phrase ‘made of’ it is plain that matter is not form; from the added phrase ‘present in a thing’ it is plain that matter is not privation.

To the Question

7. I reply by saying that in a generable and corruptible thing there is only one positive reality, which some of them [Richard of Middleton, Albert the Great] call matter and some form, differing only in the term used. The reason is that just as an unlimited quantity is limited by an intrinsic and not extrinsic term that really differs from it, so matter without form is unlimited and is limited by a form as by a term intrinsic to it and not really different from it. And this same entity, considered as unlimited, is called the matter; considered as term it is called the form; considered as a whole, that is as terminated, it is called the composite, and yet it is really one and the same whole. There is a confirmation from the Philosopher On Generation 1 text 10, 23, where he distinguishes generation from alteration and says that generation is the making of the whole and corruption is the destruction of the whole, and that when one thing is generated from another the whole of the one is converted into the whole of the other, but not so in the case of alteration. So there is not anything common that remains the same in the thing generated and the thing corrupted, for then what has just been said would not be true, as is plain.

8. On the contrary: This position is contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher when he maintains that there are four per se causes, because in this case there would only be two, namely the efficient and final causes. That there would not be the fourth is plain because you do not posit that there is a difference between matter and form; and that there would not be the third is also plain because the same thing is precisely not cause of itself. Hence each of the intrinsic causes in the composition is in some way different from that of which it is the cause; for the composite at any rate states more than form per se states or than matter per se states. And I say this according to the position of the Commentator, who maintained this on the ground that the same thing is precisely not the cause of itself.

9. Again, substance is divided into simple and composite substance, so not every substance is equally simple really, as this position says.

10. Again, it then follows that a natural agent can create. For the principles of a contrary do not increase but diminish the virtue of a natural agent; therefore if fire can generate fire from air, it will be able to do the same much more quickly when it presupposes nothing, because you say that generation is the production of the whole such that nothing common to the corrupted thing remains in the generated thing. For the presence of air does not strengthen but rather weakens the power of fire, since air has a certain repugnance to fire.

11. I say     therefore that matter is a certain positive entity in the composite.

12. I prove this as follows: a per se principle of nature, a per se cause, a per se foundation of forms, a per se subject of generation, a per se part of a composite, is some per se positive thing; but matter is of this sort; therefore etc     . The major is plain because principle depends on principle, and effect on per se cause, and foundation on foundation, and thing generated on subject of generation, and whole on part; but it is impossible that some true being should depend really on a non-being. Proof of the minor: for matter is a per se principle of nature, is thereby also a per se cause (Physics 2 text 7), is a per se foundation of forms (Metaphysics 5 text 2), and is a per se subject of generation, and a per se part of the composite (Metaphysics 7 text 28). I say, therefore, that matter is some positive being in act and not only in subjective potency, as the other opinion maintains; indeed it is an objective potency, and although it is called potency with respect to the form or the composite, it is yet in itself some act (though rather imperfectly), as is plain, because whatever is outside its efficient cause is some act.

13. To the reason for the opinion [n.7], therefore, I say that form is not an intrinsic degree of matter, because if it was then, since matter has the same nature in all generable and corruptible things, the result would be that all generable and corruptible things would belong to the same species, which is absurd; nor even is it necessary that quantity be always limited by an intrinsic grade, but on the contrary there is an extrinsic limit, as point is in the case of line and line in the case of surface and so on.

14. To the authority from the Philosopher [n.7], which for them is merely verbal, I say that generation terminates per se at the composite not only simply but also in a certain respect. The philosopher states one of these because whiteness is not produced but only a white thing is; but because it is produced from matter and form it is per se one; from accident and subject, however, something one per accidens comes to be; and consequently the former is a true whole and the latter a whole in a certain respect. For this reason is generation said to be the making of a whole.

To the Arguments

15. To the first main argument [n.2] I say that because act and form are what distinguish, and because matter does not have form of itself as an intrinsic term,     therefore does the Philosopher say that matter is not a what nor a what-sort-of etc     ; and this is distinctly and per se true.

16. To the second [n.3] the reply is that the statement ‘what is changed exists’ holds to this extent, that though what is proximate to motion is a potential entity (as the Philosopher says), yet it is necessarily so connected to an entity simply that what is changed is necessarily a complete being simply, but what is generated does not immediately have complete being simply but gets being from what is connected to it.

17. To the third [n.4] I say that matter is in itself per se knowable, just as it has per se its proper being and has its proper idea in God; but it is not per se knowable to us because of the weakness of our intellect, which is not able to grasp what has little and imperfect being; and matter is of this sort being, according to Augustine Confessions 12.32, properly nothing.

18. To the fourth [n.5] I say that matter is not act as act means what forms and perfects but as it is the potency that is informed and perfected; but it is act in the way that act is a difference of being, because it falls under the member of the division that is act. For matter is not merely objective matter, for in this way whatever is outside its cause and is posited in fact is act; and then from such act, and from the act simply that form is, it is indeed a one per se; and this is necessary, otherwise every substance is substance simply, or is a composite of being and nothing etc.